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The focus of this paper is the view about fundamental natural properties known as 
dispositional monism. This is a holistic view about nature, according to which all properties 
are essentially interrelated. The general question to be addressed concerns what kinds of 
features relational structures of properties should be thought to have. I use Alexander Bird’s 
graph-theoretic framework for representing dispositional structures as a starting point, 
before arguing that it is inadequate in certain important respects. I then propose a more 
parsimonious graph-theoretic system which, among other things, overhauls Bird’s distinction 
between stimulus and manifestation relations.    
 
1. Introduction 
In Alexander Bird’s book Nature’s Metaphysics: Laws and Properties (2007a) and his 2007b 
article, he offers a dispositional theory of properties (explained below) and provides a way of 
representing structures of dispositions using the resources of graph theory. These graphs may 
be regarded as representing what the world could be like in terms of the natural property 
structure that obtains. Not any graph whatsoever can successfully represent a possible 
property structure, however. At various points in his work, Bird suggests that four main 
constraints should be put into place, so that some of the important features of dispositionality 
are respected. After outlining Bird’s account I will dispute the way Bird understands the 
nature of dispositional interaction, and this will lead me to reject one of his constraints and to 
propose a new graph-theoretic system. More precisely, I will begin by arguing, for both 
empirical and metaphysical reasons, that disposition manifestations are typically mutual 
manifestations of reciprocal dispositions working together. Thus, I support Martin (1993) and 
Heil’s (2003) view of dispositional interaction. This leads me to the conclusion that the 
stimulus relations (discussed below) in Bird’s property graphs should be eradicated, bringing 
the advantage of making the graph-theoretic framework more parsimonious. This 
modification then leads to two further ones: first, we should allow that some manifestation 
relationships may have more than three terms, and second, we should allow that some 
dispositions may manifest spontaneously, of their own accord. Not only are there empirical 
reasons for accepting these further modifications, they also serve to reconcile the mutual 
manifestation model with Bird’s other graph-theoretic constraints. Thus, the mutual 
manifestation model proposed cannot simply be rejected by Bird and his followers on the 
basis that it unavoidably clashes with their other graph-theoretic commitments. Finally, I will 
discuss a feature of property structures not discussed by Bird, namely, that some elements in 
the structures will not be the manifestations of any others. Again, I suggest empirical reasons 
for thinking that this feature is not problematic. 
 
2. Bird’s Account 
Bird’s starting point is the view of natural properties known as dispositional monism, a view 
originally advocated by Shoemaker (1980) and currently held by Mumford (2004) and Bird 
himself, among others. The central claim of this view is that all natural properties (and 
relations) are nothing but dispositions for further manifestations. On this view, the nature of 
the property of being charged, for example, consists in an orientation to towards certain 
behavioural manifestations, such as acceleration, which may be manifested by a charged 
particle in an electro-static field.1 Given that the nature of a disposition is entirely determined 
by the kind of manifestation(s) that it is a disposition for, the dispositional monists are, as 
Mumford highlights, left with a holistic view on which all properties ‘form an interconnected 
web’ (2004, 182). More specifically, on Bird’s account, properties are connected by internal 
second-order ‘manifestation relations’ (2007b, 527). These relations are second-order in the 
sense that they hold between the properties themselves. (First-order relations, on the other 
hand, hold between the particulars things that bear such properties). To say these relations are 
internal is to say that they hold essentially, doing justice to the fact, indicated above, that the 
very identity of a disposition is determined by its directedness to a certain kind of 
manifestation. Of course, on the dispositional monist picture, these further manifestations will 
themselves be dispositional in nature, and so will essentially bear further second-order 
manifestation relations to further manifestation properties, and so on. On Bird’s view, these 
manifestation relations are best understood as relations between properties construed as 
universals, but perhaps such relations could also be understood as holding between classes of 
property tropes. In any case, the key point for our purposes is that, on this view, manifestation 
relations constitute the nature of the fundamental properties of the natural world. 
As indicated already, Bird goes on to offer a way of representing relational structures of 
properties. Following Dipert (1997), who holds that particulars are relational in nature, Bird 
appeals to the resources of graph theory (with some modifications). These graphs involve 
nodes (or ‘vertices’) which are connected via directed lines (or ‘arcs’), with the nodes 
representing the properties, and the directed arcs representing the internal manifestation 
relations in which those properties stand. These relations have a direction because, generally, 
the relationship between a disposition and its manifestation property is asymmetric. For 
example, whilst acceleration is a manifestation of a particle’s being charged, being charged is 
not the manifestation of acceleration. Bird also adds that the nature of a property is 
determined by the kind of stimulus which prompts the manifestations in question, and so he 
adds to his framework directed arcs corresponding to stimulus relations. To return to the 
charged particle case, we might say for example that the properties of the electro-static field 
are responsible for the stimulation of the charged particle’s disposition to accelerate, a fact 
that must be reflected in our property graphs. Now, in Bird’s graphs, arcs containing colored-
in arrows correspond to manifestation relations and arcs containing clear arrows correspond 
to stimulus relations. Stimulus and manifestation relations which concern the same property 
(i.e. form a three-place stimulus-manifestation relationship) are represented by arcs which 
share the same line hatching. Figure 1 represents Bird’s example of a six-node dispositional 
graph (2007b, 533, in Figure 10). 
 
Figure 1  Bird’s Six-node Graph (Reproduced Courtesy of Wiley-Blackwell). 
 
As suggested earlier, such graphs may be understood as representing what a world may be 
like in terms of the property structure that obtains.2 Not any graph whatsoever may represent 
a property structure that is genuinely possible, however. As Bird points out, an axiom of the 
graph-theoretic system must be that dispositional structures are asymmetric, which is to say, 
using graph-theoretic terminology, that property graphs must not be susceptible to any non-
trivial automorphisms (2007b, 528). 3 Great importance is placed on this constraint, because 
with it in play a response becomes available to a regress objection that is often raised against 
dispositional monism.4 Critics have worried that because, according to dispositional monism, 
the identity of each and every property is fixed by its relations to further properties, when we 
come to pinning down the identity of property, we either set off on an infinite regress of 
manifestation relations or come back around in a circle to the property in question (see Lowe 
2006, 138 for example). As a result, the identity of a property can never be fixed. It seems 
this worry can be assuaged if all dispositional structures are asymmetric, however. As Bird 
points out, if this is the case then the identities of properties are ‘…fully determined by the 
asymmetric pattern of those structures’ (2007b, 534). That is, if each property has unique 
relational features (in virtue of asymmetry), each property will be distinguishable from every 
other. Will it merely be a happy co-incidence if the property graph of our world is 
asymmetric in this way, or is it that such graphs are asymmetric necessarily? Although Bird 
does not appear to address this question, the answer seems to be that they are indeed 
asymmetric by necessity. Given that the nature of a disposition is exhausted by its 
manifestation (and stimulus) relations, there can be no question of a graph representing two 
distinct properties which share all the same relational features. In other words, the principle 
of the identity of indiscernibles seems to be true on the dispositional monist picture, at least 
in the case of properties. This is because if ‘two’ properties did bear the same relational 
features, then the dispositional monist would have no reason to think of ‘them’ as being 
distinct properties, rather than being the very same property. In other words, a property graph 
which appeared symmetric would, so to speak, collapse into an asymmetric one.  
The next graph constraint in Bird’s system is that each node in the graph must have at 
least one manifestation relation leading away from it. This clearly has to be the case, since if 
a node did not bear a manifestation relation, then it could not be said to represent a 
disposition given that dispositions are entirely characterized by their manifestation relations.  
The third constraint is that if a graph represents fundamental properties, each node must 
have at most one manifestation relation leading away from it. Bird’s argument here is that if a 
property had multiple manifestations, it would be what is known as a ‘multi-track’ 
disposition, as opposed to ‘single-track’. Bird suggests that multi-track properties should not 
be regarded as fundamental, because of their complexity (2007a, 21–4; see also Mumford 
2004, 172, who suggests that the properties in fundamental particle physics should turn out to 
be single-track dispositions). Briefly, Bird’s argument is that the ascription of a multi-track 
disposition (such as that of being able to speak French) is in general equivalent to the 
ascription of a conjunction of single-track dispositions (one of which, in the speaking French 
case, will be, say, the disposition to answer a specific question in a specific way). Given that 
these single-track dispositions are more basic, it is those that come closer to being 
fundamental. It may of course be that there are properties, especially in the special sciences, 
which are thoroughly multi-track, and if this is the case then the single-manifestation 
constraint will obviously not apply to graphs representing those properties. It is worth 
pointing out, however, that if something like physical reductionism is true, the fundamental 
property graphs will be of primary importance, since the higher-level multi-track graphs will 
be derivable from them. For this reason, it is important to consider how the fundamentality 
constraint can be satisfied, as we will later on.  
The final constraint offered by Bird, which has been mentioned already, is that each node 
in a property graph should also stand in a relation to some ‘stimulus’ property, as well as a 
manifestation property. This is because a dispositional property is not only a property for a 
certain manifestation, ‘…but is also essentially a disposition to do something in response to 
something else, the stimulus’ (2007b, 532). Therefore, if our graphs are to reveal the 
complete nature of a property, relations to stimulus properties must be added to the graph-
theoretic framework, in the way highlighted earlier in this section. 
It may be objected at this point that it is a mistake to think of there being stimulus 
properties, because the stimulus for a thing’s disposition is more naturally described as a 
concrete state of affairs or event, which involves particulars (which bear the dispositions in 
question) being in contact with certain stimulating partners. When metaphysicians speak of 
‘stimulus conditions’, for example, it is this kind of state of affairs that they typically have in 
mind. In the case of a charged particle manifesting acceleration, the stimulus condition will 
be, for example, the state of affairs of the particle being in contact with the electro-static 
field. Why, then, does Bird think that the notion of a stimulus property also has an important 
role to play? At this point, it is important to recall that Bird’s graphs, which involve the 
stimulus properties, represent second-order structures. These second-order structures, which 
involve the abstract ontological dependences between the properties themselves, need to be 
clearly distinguished from the concrete events involving things-bearing-properties, which 
stimulus conditions are about. Moreover, on the picture under consideration the second-order 
structures, represented by the graphs, are explanatorily prior to the stimulus conditions 
concerning particulars, thus serving to explain why these stimulus conditions are as they are. 
Let us return to the charged particle case to illustrate. How is the nature of the stimulus 
condition for a particle’s property of being charged to be explained? An explanation available 
to those who accept the Bird-type framework is this. As well as being essentially related to a 
certain manifestation, the property of being charged is essentially related via the second-order 
(internal) stimulus relation to a stimulus property, or perhaps multiple stimulus properties 
depending on whether charge is fundamental. Because of this, if the property of being 
charged is instantiated in a particular, the concrete manifestation of that property can only be 
brought about insofar as there is an involvement of another particular instantiating the 
relevant stimulus property. The reason, then, why a particle’s being in contact with an 
electro-static field prompts the acceleration of the particle is that an instance of the 
appropriate stimulus property – had by the field in this case – is embedded within that state of 
affairs.  
The kind of explanatory strategy just outlined is not unique to the dispositional monist 
view under consideration. Structurally similar explanations are at work in the metaphysical 
system of D.M. Armstrong, for example. Armstrong identifies laws with second-order states 
of affairs, involving ‘N’ relations between properties (see Armstrong 1983, Chapter 6), just as 
Bird’s second-order structures concern manifestation and stimulus relations between 
properties. On Armstrong’s account, these relationships between properties then serve to 
explain why the causal patterns in the world are as they are.5 
There is also a further explanatory advantage of Bird’s account of stimulus relations, 
which Bird himself does not emphasize. The advantage in question is that the stimulus 
relations among properties serve to explain why more than one kind of particular is able to 
stimulate the manifestation of a certain property had by another. To use a macroscopic 
example, a hard floor, as well as a hammer, is able to trigger the manifestation of a vase’s 
fragility when the two collide, and the reason is that a hard floor and a hammer both 
instantiate the relevant stimulus property: they are both rigid.  
Bearing in mind the points raised in this section about Bird’s stimulus properties, we 
might sum up the Bird-type framework by saying that stimulus properties play a dual role. 
Stimulus properties (along with manifestation properties) serve to fix the very identities of 
dispositions, in virtue of the relations at the second-order level. Moreover, these stimulus 
relationships also explain why the stimulus conditions for concrete cases of dispositional 
interaction are as they are.   
To recap, then, on Bird’s graph-theoretic system, four main constraints are put in place,  
which we may label as follows: 
i) The identity constraint: a graph must not be susceptible to any non-trivial 
automorphisms. 
ii) The manifestation constraint: each node in a graph must have at least one 
manifestation relation directed away from it. 
iii) The fundamentality constraint: each node in a graph representing the fundamental 
properties (but perhaps not all graphs) must have at most one manifestation relation 
leading away from it. 
iv) The stimulus constraint: each node in a graph must also bear an outgoing relation 
be to a stimulus property, as well as a manifestation property.    
In the next section, I will now begin to critically assess this graph-theoretic system.  
 
3. Modifying Bird’s Account: The Stimulus Constraint 
I now want to suggest that the nature of dispositional interaction is misrepresented by Bird’s 
system, and this means first and foremost that the stimulus constraint must be eradicated. In 
light of this, I will propose a new graph-theoretic system on which Bird’s basic three-place 
stimulus-manifestation structure is replaced with what we may call the ‘mutual 
manifestation’ structure. On the assumption that Bird’s other graph-theoretic constraints are 
to be preserved, the mutual manifestation modification leads to two others: first, that mutual 
manifestation relationships of varying adicity should be allowed, and second, that graphs 
representing spontaneously manifesting dispositions should be allowed. These modifications 
bring the advantage of reconciling the mutual manifestation model with Bird’s other 
constraints (excluding of course the stimulus constraint, which the mutual manifestation 
model replaces). However, we will also see that there are independent empirical reasons for 
accepting the aforementioned modifications, and so acceptance of them does not rely on the 
assumption that Bird’s other constraints are ultimately correct. For that reason, I will not 
scrutinize the ‘identity’, ‘manifestation’ and ‘fundamentality’ constraints in any more detail 
than that provided in the last section. 
Let us begin first, then, by questioning Bird’s stimulus constraint. As we saw in the 
charged particle example above, it seems Bird is right to acknowledge that a disposition’s 
manifestation is in some sense dependent on the presence of a further property. There is 
typically a conditional aspect to dispositions, which is to say they do not give rise to their 
manifestation entirely of their own accord. It is noticeable, however, that in Bird’s structures, 
the manifestation property to which a disposition is related is generally not also classed as the 
manifestation of the stimulus property; the manifestations of a disposition and its stimulus 
property are taken to be different. That this is so can clearly be seen in Bird’s graph in Figure 
1. I do not think that this is the correct way of viewing the matter, however. Plausibly, a 
manifestation should be regarded as the manifestation of both the properties involved. i.e., 
both the disposition and what Bird calls the ‘stimulus’ property. I will now explain why. 
Let us consider in more detail the concrete case in which a particle manifests its charge by 
accelerating through an electro-static force field. What is it about a field which makes it the 
case that a charged particle accelerates when placed within it? Again, the obvious (and only) 
answer, for the dispositional monist, will be that the field is able to prompt the acceleration in 
virtue of some property – which is to say disposition – that it has. In explaining the 
acceleration, it would be natural to speak of the field’s disposition to set the particle in 
motion, as well as the particle’s charge. Might this suggest that the manifestation event (the 
acceleration) is as much the manifestation of the field’s dispositions as it is the particle’s 
charge? C.B. Martin thinks so, arguing as he does that disposition manifestations are always 
the mutual manifestations of what he calls the ‘reciprocal dispositions’ involved (Armstrong 
et al. 1996, 136; see also Heil 2003, 198). According to Martin, a dissolving event, for 
example, is not only the manifestation of the solute’s solubility, but also of the dispositions of 
the solvent. The dissolving event is the ‘common product’ (1993, 182) of reciprocal 
dispositions working together rather than the manifestation of just one of the dispositions 
involved. If this case is representative of how in general properties relate to manifestations, 
then clearly our second-order graph-theoretic models must be made to reflect this. 
As is clear in Bird’s graphs (see Figure 1, for example), he sees stimulus properties as 
ones which have distinct manifestations to those of the dispositions they stimulate, and so he 
does not accommodate the kind of mutual manifestation structure discussed. One wonders 
where this leaves the contribution made by the stimulus property in concrete cases, however. 
For example, what, in the particle case discussed, can the manifestation of the field’s stimulus 
property be if not the acceleration event itself? What other event can the manifestation of the 
field’s disposition be thought to consist in? It is difficult to see what event this manifestation 
can be identified with, if not the acceleration. For one thing, evidence suggests that the 
acceleration begins the very instant that the particle finds itself in the field, and so there is 
simply no time for the field to bring about a distinct ‘stimulating’ manifestation (whatever 
that may be) which, say, then causes the acceleration of the particle.  
The mutual manifestation model is therefore supported by empirical cases. But are there 
any good metaphysical reasons for thinking the view should be generalized? There are, and 
one such argument has been presented in my 2010 (Section 5). The argument is that Martin’s 
model is needed so that a potential regress of stimuli is avoided. The regress looms when we 
ask what stimulates a stimulating property. This is surely a reasonable question, especially for 
Bird who acknowledges that dispositions have a conditional aspect to them. But once it is 
acknowledged that a stimulus property may itself be dependent on a further stimulating 
property in order for it to do its work, one can then ask what it is that stimulates this further 
stimulating property, and so on, ad infinitum. If properties have to wait for an infinite number 
of concrete events before manifesting, each involving different stimulus properties, it 
becomes a mystery how dispositions ever get around to manifesting. The solution is to view 
properties as forming reciprocal groups for mutual manifestation. Thus, rather than a regress 
of stimulus properties, we have a mutual dependence amongst reciprocal dispositions. The 
dependence is mutual in the sense that these dispositions prompt each other when instances of 
them are brought together. This means that instances of disposition manifestation have to 
wait for only one concrete stimulus event (rather than an infinite number): the event of 
reciprocal dispositions coming together.6 
In sum, there are several reasons for favoring the mutual-manifestation model of 
dispositional interaction. In Section 6, we will see that there are reasons for thinking that not 
all disposition manifestations are dependent upon the involvement of further reciprocal 
dispositions, in which case not all manifestations are ultimately mutual manifestations. But 
even so, the foregoing discussion suggests that in those cases where a manifestation is 
dependent upon the contribution of more than one disposition, the mutual manifestation 
model is more plausible than Bird’s model. How, then, can the mutual manifestation 
relationships between dispositions be reflected in our graph-theoretic system?  This can be 
done by firstly relating the reciprocal dispositions to the very same manifestation property. 
This means that manifestation nodes will typically have more than one incoming 
manifestation arc. Secondly, asymmetric ‘stimulus’ relations must be eradicated, because on 
the view being proposed none of the dispositions in a reciprocal group are privileged as being 
either that which is the stimulating factor, or as being that which is stimulated. All 
dispositions in the group are equally crucial for the manifestation, such as the disposition of 
the particle and the reciprocal disposition of the field in the acceleration case described 
above. Indeed, nothing at all like stimulus relations are needed in the modified graphs, since 
the arrangement of manifestation relations alone will indicate which properties are reciprocal 
partners: they will be the properties that are directed towards a common manifestation. 
Overall, then, this new view of dispositional structures is more parsimonious in terms of the 
kinds of entities it invokes, and this is another reason why this system may be seen to be 
preferable to Bird’s.  
In representing these modified structures, I will add some clarity-enhancing features to 
help clearly distinguish the various mutual manifestations within a graph. Whilst not 
essential, these clarity-enhancing features will be especially helpful where larger graphs are 
concerned. In these larger graphs, distinct mutual manifestations will be identified using lines 
with different hatching, and nodes belonging in the same reciprocal group will be connected 
with an arrowless line (or ‘edge’). For now, however, we will focus on smaller graphs. Figure 
2a below shows the basic mutual manifestation structure. We might also allow structures 
exemplified in Figure 2b, if we follow Bird in thinking that there can be ‘looping’ 
manifestation relations. Looping manifestation relations are accepted by Bird on the grounds 
that some dispositions appear to be reflexive. An example of a reflexive disposition, offered 
by Bird, is the disposition of being magnetic, the manifestation of which can involve inducing 
yet more magnetism (2007b, 529). 
 
Figure 2   The Basic Mutual-Manifestation Models. 
Using these new mutual manifestation structures, we may build larger graphs which 
represent more complex structures. The simplest cases of mutual manifestation are those 
involving just two reciprocal dispositions, as in Figure 2a. In Section 5, we will address 
potential reasons for accepting the possibility of reciprocal groups containing more than two 
members. We can, however, see in the six-node graph in Figure 3 that larger graphs can be 
built up entirely out of the simplest mutual manifestation structures (from Figure 2a). Note 
that this larger graph satisfies all the other graph constraints discussed earlier (excluding of 
course Bird’s stimulus constraint, which the mutual manifestation model replaces): the graph 
is suitably asymmetric, and each node has a single outgoing manifestation relation, indicating 
that the properties represented may be fundamental in Bird’s sense.  
 
Figure 3  A Six-node Mutual-Manifestation Graph. 
 
 
 
4. The Problem of the Three-Node Graph 
It should be acknowledged that when we apply the basic mutual manifestation model to 
certain graphs, and try to respect the first three constraints in Bird’s system, various problems 
do arise. Indeed, this is perhaps the reason why Bird does not endorse the kind of mutual 
manifestation model discussed here (although this is not an issue he addresses). However, in 
the remainder of this paper I will argue that the mutual manifestation model can be reconciled 
with these other graph-theoretic constraints once two minor and plausible modifications are 
accepted. Thus, Bird and his followers cannot merely reject the mutual manifestation model 
on the grounds that it unavoidably clashes with their prior graph-theoretic commitments. 
Furthermore, these two modifications will be shown to be plausible for empirical reasons 
independent of Bird’s graph constraints, and so should be accepted even by those not 
convinced by Bird’s other constraints.  
Let us begin by considering the following basic three-node graph in Figure 4a. Firstly, this 
graph does not satisfy the identity constraint, since the bottom two nodes are structurally 
indistinguishable. Secondly, the top node has no outgoing manifestation relation, and so 
violates the manifestation constraint. Both of these problems can be remedied by adding a 
further mutual manifestation relationship to the graph, as can be seen in Figure 4b. In this 
modified graph, each node has an outgoing manifestation and the graph is suitably 
asymmetric. The problem is, however, that in this modified graph the node to the right (in 
Figure 4b) now has two different kinds of manifestation, and so violates Bird’s 
fundamentality constraint. All of this suggests that on the new system as it stands, a three-
node graph of properties which are fundamental in Bird’s sense is not possible. This does not 
of course mean that the graph of Figure 4b is not suitable for representing a structure of non-
fundamental properties. But nevertheless, the lack of resources for modelling a world 
containing just three fundamental properties is problematic for the dispositional monist given 
that there seems no obvious reason for ruling out that our world might contain just three 
fundamental physical properties. 
 
Figure 4  Problematic Three-node Mutual-Manifestation Graphs. 
 
5. ‘Odd’ Graphs and the Adicity of Mutual Manifestation Relationships 
Rather than abandoning any of the graph constraints discussed previously (excluding, of 
course, Bird’s stimulus constraint, which the mutual manifestation model already replaces), 
the dispositional monist might think it is a small price to pay to bite the bullet and rule out the 
possibility that our world might contain just three fundamental natural properties. 
Unfortunately, however, the kind of problem facing the three-node graph of fundamental 
properties is going to arise again for any mutual manifestation graph containing an odd 
number of nodes. This is because, thus far, we have been dealing with the simplest case of 
mutual manifestation which involves just two reciprocal properties and so two manifestation 
relations (i.e., one outgoing from each of the two reciprocal properties). Now, if we posit only 
these simple cases of mutual manifestation, a property graph will always contain an even 
number of manifestation relations in total. This clearly has the consequence that at least one 
node in an ‘odd’ graph will either lack an outgoing manifestation relation or have more than 
one outgoing manifestation relation. More precisely, for all n, where n is an odd number of 
nodes, if there are ((n-1) ÷ 2) sets of mutual manifestation relationships, there will in total be 
(n-1) manifestation relations in the structure, and so one of the nodes is bound to lack an 
outgoing manifestation relation. If one remedies this by adding a further mutual manifestation 
relationship (so ((n+1) ÷ 2) in total), there will then be (n+1) manifestation relations, and so 
one of the properties will inevitably have more than one outgoing manifestation relation, 
making it non-fundamental on Bird’s definition. 
In order to save the graph constraints, one could take the bold step of accepting that a 
world containing an odd number of properties in total (what I will call an ‘odd’ world) simply 
is impossible. But since we have no independent reason to believe that ‘odd’ worlds are 
impossible, critics are likely to assert that dispositional monism leads to embarrassing, if not 
absurd, consequences.7 
Fortunately, however, our framework can be straightforwardly modified so that graphs 
involving an odd number of properties can be constructed which do respect the mutual 
manifestation constraint as well as Bird’s other constraints (again, excluding the stimulus 
constraint, which the mutual manifestation model already replaces). If we allow that some 
manifestations can be the manifestations of more than two reciprocal dispositions, we can 
allow that there could be an odd number of manifestation relations being directed towards a 
certain manifestation. The problem of ‘odd’ fundamental structures then dissolves, for if an 
‘odd’ graph can involve an odd number of manifestation relations in total, there is no reason 
why each property represented cannot have a single manifestation, thereby satisfying Bird’s 
fundamentality constraint.  
Should the allowance of groups of reciprocal dispositions containing an odd number of 
members be seen as an ad hoc or problematic modification? I do not think so, as there seem 
to be actual cases of manifestation involving more than two reciprocal partners. To use a 
macroscopic example, the igniting of a match is plausibly a manifestation that is brought 
about by at least three distinct reciprocal dispositional partners: the flammable match, the 
rough surface on which it is struck, and the oxygen. Of course, this is not a case involving 
fundamental properties, but given that these kinds of interactions are common in everyday 
cases, it would not be surprising if more than two dispositions were required to bring about 
certain fundamental manifestations. In order to rule out in principle the possibility of 
fundamental manifestations which require more than two contributory factors, it seems we 
would need a priori reasons for doing so, and I cannot imagine what those reasons could 
possibly be. Moreover, from what we currently know about fundamental interactions in our 
world, there seem to be actual examples of manifestations which are the upshot of more than 
two contributing properties. Consider, for example, the force imparted upon a sub-atomic 
particle travelling through a (non-uniform) magnetic field. The precise nature of such a force 
is sensitive to at least three of the properties involved: the spin of the particle, the velocity of 
the particle, and the magnetic properties of the field. 
It might still be objected, however, that accepting that there must be at least one ‘odd’ 
reciprocal group in a world containing an odd number of properties is just as worryingly ad 
hoc as having to deny the very possibility of ‘odd’ worlds. In response, it must be admitted 
that an independent reason for accepting this aspect of the solution is not being provided. 
However, it seems clear that as far as dispositional monism is concerned, this new constraint 
is far less restrictive than the alternative constraint which says there cannot be any ‘odd’ 
worlds at all and is much more palatable as a result. By accepting the impossibility of ‘odd’ 
worlds the dispositional monist cuts down the number of possible worlds by around a half, 
but with this new constraint in place, most of the ‘odd’ worlds which seem prima face to be 
possible are indeed possible. There are, of course, still constraints on how ‘odd’ worlds can 
be structured, but that is equally the case with the dispositional monists’ ‘even’ worlds. 
Moreover, the constraint I have introduced concerning the ‘odd’ worlds is not a particularly 
onerous one. Where the number of odd properties is relatively high, there will be many graph 
permutations for fundamental properties such that each property involved has a single 
manifestation. There will be successful permutations, for example, on which there is just one 
‘odd’ group of reciprocal dispositions, or there may be several such groups. And those groups 
may contain three, five, seven, or any odd number of members.     
 
6. The Three-Node Graph Again: Spontaneously Manifesting Dispositions 
Unfortunately, while allowance of mutual manifestation relationships of varying adicity does 
allow some acceptable ‘odd’ property graphs to be constructed, this modification still does 
not help with the three node case. If we ensure that such a graph respects the manifestation 
and fundamentality constraints, we are left with the graph in Figure 5. Clearly, the identity 
constraint is violated, since the bottom two nodes are relationally indistinguishable. 
 
Figure 5  A Three-node Mutual-Manifestation Graph Violating the Identity Constraint. 
 
Again, if we respect the mutual manifestation model I am proposing, we seem to be faced 
with the choice of either giving up on a plausible graph constraint – the identity constraint in 
this case – or accepting that a world containing just three fundamental properties (in Bird’s 
sense) is impossible. Fortunately, however, this situation can be straightforwardly avoided by 
the introduction of a further plausible modification. In order to add asymmetry to the original 
three-node graph in Figure 4a, all we need to do is to allow one of the nodes to be the 
manifestation of a single property only. In other words, the property which is directed 
towards the manifestation in question must not enter into any reciprocal relationships. Unlike 
typical dispositions, this kind of disposition would be able to manifest without the aid of a 
further reciprocal property. Such a property can be modelled in a simple way using a single 
directed arc: see Figure 6a. Adding a relation of this kind to our original three-node graph 
leaves us with the graph in Figure 6b. Clearly, this graph (Figure 6b) is apt for representing a 
world involving just three fundamental properties as Bird understands them: each node has a 
single outgoing manifestation relation and the graph is asymmetric.8 
 
Figure 6  The Basic Spontaneous Manifestation Model (a) and an Acceptable Three-node Graph  
  Involving a Spontaneous Manifestation Relation (b). 
 
We might call these dispositions which manifest of their own accord ‘spontaneously 
manifesting’ dispositions. Bird does not mention such dispositions when outlining his graph-
theoretic system, but allowance of such dispositions should not be thought to be ad hoc or 
problematic. For one thing, there is empirical evidence that there are spontaneously 
manifesting properties in our own world, suggesting that Martin is hasty in his apparent 
suggestion that disposition manifestation always involves reciprocity (1993, 182). An 
example is that of a particle’s disposition to radio-actively decay, which as far as we know 
may manifest entirely of its own accord i.e., without requiring the contribution of something 
else. It is because of cases like this that Heil, who advocates the mutual manifestation model 
in most cases, does not claim that all dispositions mutually manifest with reciprocal partners 
(2003, 198). And if it is reasonable to suppose that not all manifestations are cases of mutual 
manifestation, there is no obvious reason why the possibility of fundamental spontaneously 
manifesting dispositions should be ruled out. Moreover, it should also be pointed out that 
allowing the possibility of spontaneously manifesting dispositions brings another benefit in 
that it provides another resource for letting larger graphs, such as the ‘odd’ graphs discussed 
in the last section, satisfy the mutual manifestation constraint along with Bird’s existing 
constraints (again, excluding the stimulus constraint, which the mutual manifestation model 
replaces). If there can be combinations of mutual manifestation relationships of varying 
adicity and also manifestations requiring just a single spontaneous disposition, then there will 
be a rich variety of graphs all of which can satisfy each of the identity, manifestation and 
fundamentality constraints. This, importantly, allows the dispositional monists to do justice to 
the thought that there are numerous ways that science might discover the world to be. 
To summarize, then, if Bird were to accept Heil’s view on the matter of spontaneous 
dispositions, as I urge he should, he could accept the mutual manifestation model I have 
recommended without giving up on any of the other plausible graph-theoretic constraints 
advocated. This is, I suggest, an attractive feature of the graph-theoretic system proposed. 
 
7. A Final Word about Dispositions Which Are Not Manifestations of Others 
It is noticeable that in my earlier six-node graph (Figure 3) four of the nodes have no 
manifestation relations leading to them from elsewhere. This means that this graph involves 
properties which cannot be manifested at the first-order level by any other properties in their 
world. In fact, all satisfactory structures on the graph-theoretic system proposed will involve 
at least one property that has no manifestation relation leading to it from elsewhere. It should 
be pointed out, however, that it is also a consequence of Bird’s system that in many structures 
certain properties will unavoidably lack incoming manifestation relations. For example, all 
satisfactory three-node structures on Bird’s system will involve such properties. The 
following two Bird-type graphs illustrate this point (Figures 7a and 7b), since neither of the 
left-hand properties in these structures are the manifestations of any others (note that the 
graph in Figure 7a is used by Bird himself as an example of a satisfactory structure on his 
system (2007b, 533, in Figure 10)). 
 
Figure 7  Examples of Bird-type Three-node Graph ((a) Reproduced Courtesy of Wiley-Blackwell). 
 
Should the possibility of these properties be seen as a problematic consequence of 
dispositional monism? I do not think so. There are empirical reasons for thinking that some of 
the properties in our world cannot be manifested anew by properties of other kinds. For 
example, in physics we often speak of conserved quantities, such as mass-energy. By 
definition, new quantities of these properties cannot be created anew. This does not mean that 
a particular cannot take on a quantity of energy that it did not contain before, but it does mean 
that a particular can only take on a quantity of energy insofar as that energy already exists 
and is transferred from elsewhere. But if, in this way, new quantities of these properties can 
never be created anew, then they look like good candidates for those properties represented in 
a graph which are not the manifestations of any others. This clearly does not compromise 
their status as properties, however. As long as those properties have their own manifestations, 
they are just as dispositional as any other. Properties such as charge, another conserved 
quantity, clearly pass this test: as we saw earlier, a particle’s charge may be manifested by its 
accelerating through a force field. In sum, then, this feature of the graph-theoretic system 
proposed should not be thought to be objectionable, given that properties like conserved 
quantities appear to exist even in our world. What the presence of these kinds of properties in 
all acceptable graphs might ultimately suggest is that there must always be a property (or 
multiple properties) in natural worlds which have been instantiated since the beginning of 
time, or for an infinite amount of time, and which are the entities responsible for setting the 
early dispositional mechanisms of the world in motion. Unfortunately, however, discussion of 
this thorny cosmological issue must be reserved for elsewhere. 
 
Acknowledgements 
An early version of this paper was presented in Melbourne at the metaphysics of science 
conference organized by Brian Ellis and Howard Sankey, and in Nottingham for the Royal 
Institute of Philosophy Seminar organized by Uri Leibowitz. I would like to thank the 
audiences at those events for helpful comments and to Stephen Mumford for feedback on an 
earlier draft. Finally, thanks go to the anonymous referees and to the journal editor James 
McAllister for his assistance. 
 
 
                                                            
Notes 
1  This is an example of concrete dispositional interaction which I will continue to use during this paper. It is 
useful for two reasons. First, this example involves only two entities and so is a relatively simple case to deal 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
with. Second, it is a scientifically respectable case and so conclusions drawn from it will not be hostage to 
the peculiarities of macroscopic examples. 
2  Property graphs could also serve a useful purpose for those who, while accepting that all properties have an 
irreducibly dispositional nature, deny that properties are purely dispositional. For example, this paper should 
be of interest to those, such as Martin (2008) and Heil (2003), who hold a two-sided view of properties. On 
their view, the graphs discussed in this paper could be useful as a tool for representing the features of the 
dispositional ‘sides’ of properties.   
3  More precisely, according to Bird, none of the subgraphs consisting of those vertices and arcs lying on the 
directed walk (sequence of arcs) leading away from each node must be structurally identical (2007b, 531).  
4  Interestingly I see evidence in Heil’s work to suggest that he, as a two-sided theorist, would also embrace 
something like the asymmetry requirement that is involved in the identity constraint. The asymmetry 
requirement would have to be accepted by a two-sided theorist if it were claimed that no two distinct kinds 
of categorical qualities could have the same dispositional features (thus precluding graphs with symmetries). 
Heil seems to be pushing in this direction when he suggests that one cannot change the structural features of 
a thing (typically associated by the two-sided theorists with the ‘categorical side’) without also changing the 
dispositional features of that thing. In other words, no two distinct kinds of structural feature bring the same 
kind of dispositional side. Heil discusses the case of fragility, for example, and says that ‘light bulbs, ice 
cubes, and kneecaps’, which are all structurally different, ‘shatter in very different ways’. Heil then writes: 
‘Try changing a fragile object qualitatively, without altering it dispositionally. The object might remain 
fragile, but become fragile in a different way’ (2003, 116). 
5  It should be noted that Armstrong’s strategy of explaining causal patterns in terms of his second-order laws 
has not been without its critics (see for example Mellor 1991, 168). Given the structural similarity of Bird’s 
account, it may be that similar objections will have to be answered. Unfortunately, I must postpone 
discussion of this general issue for another day. 
6  In one place Bird does briefly acknowledge the possibility that dispositions may sometimes come in 
reciprocal groups (2007b, 533), but the notion of reciprocity he invokes is different to that discussed here. In 
the three-node graph which Bird suggests represents reciprocal properties, the properties are not directed 
towards the same kind of manifestation.  
7  One might think that, equally, the dispositional monist has no independent reasons for denying the 
possibility of symmetrical property structures. I think, however, that there is an important difference between 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
the dispositional monist’s denial of symmetrical worlds, and the denial of ‘odd’ worlds. As I suggest in 
Section 2, the denial of symmetrical worlds is an essential feature of the dispositional view, whereas the 
denial of ‘odd’ worlds is entailed by a combination of non-essential constraints. This means that the rejection 
of ‘odd’ worlds is avoidable in principle. 
8   To avoid confusion, note that, just because the top node in Figure 6b has as its manifestation one of its 
reciprocal stimulus dispositions, this does not imply there are causal loops involving backwards causation at 
the first-order level. To emphasize again, the manifestation relations represented in the graphs are second-
order relations of ontological dependence between property types. If an instance of the disposition 
represented by the top node manifests, the property instance manifested will be different to the property 
instance responsible for bringing about that disposition (though those property instances would be of the 
same type, according to the graph in question). 
 
References 
ARMSTRONG, D. M. (1983) What Is a Law of Nature? (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press). 
ARMSTRONG, D. M., MARTIN, C. B., and PLACE, U. T. (1996) Dispositions: A Debate, 
T. CRANE (Ed.) (London: Routledge). 
BIRD, A. (2007a) Nature’s Metaphysics: Laws and Properties (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press). 
 ——— (2007b) The regress of pure powers? Philosophical Quarterly, 57, pp. 513-34. 
DIPERT, R. (1997) The mathematical structure of the world, Journal of Philosophy, 94, pp. 
329-58. 
HEIL, J. (2003) From an Ontological Point of View (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
LOWE, E. J. (2006) The Four Category Ontology: A Metaphysical Foundation for 
Natural Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
MARTIN, C.B. (1993) Power for realists, in J. BACON, K. CAMPBELL, and L. 
REINHARDT (Eds.) Ontology, Causality, and Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press), pp. 175-86. 
——— (2008) The Mind in Nature (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
MELLOR, D. H. (1991) Matters of Metaphysics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
MUMFORD, S. (2004) Laws in Nature (Routledge). 
SHOEMAKER, S. (1980) Causality and properties, in P. VAN INWAGEN (Ed.) Time and 
Cause (Dordrecht: Reidel), pp. 109-35. 
TUGBY, M. (2010) Simultaneity in dispositional interaction? Ratio: An International 
Journal for Analytic Philosophy, 23, pp. 322-328. 
 
 
 
